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Since the beginning of the European single currency project, the adoption of fiscal 
binding  rules,  restraining  the  use  of  the  single  policy  instrument  left  for  national 
authorities, has been challenged by many authors and politicians. The discussion has been 
rekindled  in  recent  years,  following  a  period  of  economic  recession  or  stagnation  in 
several  Member-Countries  and  some  criticisms linking  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact 
(SGP) to the general economic situation. 
Some of the questions raised by those who criticised the initial framework for fiscal 
discipline may have been taken into account in the recent revision of the SGP (March 
2005), which followed the suspension of the Pact for Germany and France and eventually 
made the SGP more flexible and “less stupid”. 
In  this  paper,  we  evaluate  the  changes  contained  in  the  “new”  SGP,  by  taking 
account  of  the  properties  for  ideal  fiscal  rules  put  forward  by  Kopits  and  Symansky 
(1998) and comparing with some recently published studies on the same topic. The main 
result  of  our  analysis  points  towards  a  clear  increase  in  flexibility  together  with  the 
probable emergence of new enforcement problems. In this context, an insufficient output 
in terms of fiscal discipline could arise, leading to the need for new improvements within 
the European framework for the definition and implementation of national fiscal policies. 
 
Keywords: EMU, SGP, Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Discipline 
JEL Classification: H62, H63, H77   3 
 
1. Introduction 
The  creation  of  an  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  involves  the  loss  of  important 
instruments of national public intervention, given that monetary and exchange policies 
are transferred from the sphere of national decision to the level of community decision. 
The  same  situation  does  not  necessarily  occur  in  terms  of  the  definition  and 
implementation of fiscal policy, which can be maintained under the jurisdiction of the 
national authorities.  In this case, it becomes the only instrument at their disposal for 
interventions  aimed  at  conjunctural  stabilisation.  Alternatively,  a  marked  degree  of 
centralisation could be observed at this level, reducing national governments’ margin of 
control even further and transferring competences in that field to a “central” government. 
The  solution  adopted  within  the  framework  of  the  European  Monetary  Union 
(EMU)  was  to  maintain  fiscal  policy  autonomy  while  limiting  the  space  for  creating 
public  deficit  and  extending  public  debt  through  the  adoption  of  (compulsory)  fiscal 
rules, possibly complemented by the coordination of national fiscal policies.  
This option was clear in the Maastricht Treaty, was reinforced by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP, European Council, 1997), and has been the object of strong criticism, 
both from politicians and academics, which has been partly taken into account in the 
recent SGP reform (European Council, 2005). 
The  analysis  of  this  discussion  and  the  assessment  of  the  “new”  SGP  are  the 
fundamental points of this paper. In section 2, we briefly present the main characteristics 
of  the  European  solution  for  fiscal  discipline  and  outline  the  main  contours  of  the 
discussion. In section 3, we refer to the properties put forward by Kopits and Symansky   4 
(1998) for defining “ideal” fiscal rules. In section 4, we assess the original SGP in the 
light of these properties and compare this analysis with others in this area. We also refer 
to  some  proposals  for  reformulating  the  SGP  that  have  been  put  forward  by  several 
authors. In section 5, we observe the main changes that have occurred as a result of the 
SGP  reform  and  assess  them,  again  using  the  classification  proposed  by  Kopits  and 
Symansky (1998). In section 6, we present some elements of final reflection, discussing 
possible improvements in the framework for fiscal policies in the eurozone. 
2. The European solution: from Maastricht to the “new” SGP 
As mentioned above, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) established the framework for national 
fiscal  policies  within  the  EMU.  Among  other  rules,  the  Treaty:  (i)  contained  a 
recommendation-prohibition  for  the  Member-States  to  avoid  creating  and  maintaining 
excessive fiscal deficits (art. 104-C, no. 1); (ii) established the criteria for classifying 
deficits as excessive (public deficit to GDP ratio greater than 3% and/or public debt to 
GDP  ratio  greater  than  60%,  apart  from  exceptional  cases);  (iii)  forbade  the 
monetarisation of the public debt (art. 104); (iv) defined cooperation and coordination 
procedures for non-monetary policies (art. 103), which, as they were too complex and not 
compulsory,  ended  up  a  long  way  from  the  proposal  contained  in  the  Delors  Report 
(1989). 
The option sanctioned by the Maastricht Treaty was later reinforced through the 
signing of the SGP, following strong German pressure. This assumed budget balance (or 
a  slight  surplus)  as  a  fundamental  objective  for  public  accounts  of  each  State  in  the 
medium run. In this way, States were ensured some margin for manoeuvre in the event of   5 
a negative shock, without affecting the fiscal discipline defined by the rules determined in 
the Treaty. 
In addition to this, and reinforcing the restrictive aspect of the rules and the non-
commitment with regard to the question of coordination, the SGP also established that:  
(i)  countries  would  be  obliged  to  present  stability  programmes,  which  would 
indicate the budgetary objectives in the medium run, as well as the foreseen method of 
adjusting possible imbalances and the anticipated evolution of public debt to GDP ratio, 
with these programmes being examined by the Council and by the Commission;  
(ii) if a State, considered in excessive deficit, did not put into practice the Council’s 
recommendations,  it  could  be  object  of  sanctions,  in  the  form  of  fines  with  a  fixed 
element (0.2% of the GDP) and a variable element (1/10 of the difference between the 
effective public deficit to GDP ratio and the reference value) and with a maximum level 
of 0.5% of the GDP per year; the sanction would be automatic if the real GDP had an 
annual growth no lesser than -0.75% and should not be considered if the real GDP had 
decreased annually by at least 2% (in the intermediate situation, there would be a political 
decision taken by the Council). 
This solution has been the object of deep discussion and criticism in political and 
academic  circles.  This  does  not  generally  involve  questioning  the  need  for  fiscal 
discipline, taken as an essential element for creating a favourable environment regarding 
to stability and economic growth and as a means of avoiding negative external effects 
resulting from deficient budgetary behaviour (De Grauwe, 2005). Instead, the discussion 
has  been  centred  round  the  way  in  which  this  discipline  should  be  implemented  and 
controlled.   6 
In the first half of the 90s, and even at the time of the SGP discussion, the doubts 
and the criticisms were already extremely varied in relation to the adopted solution (e.g., 
Buiter et al., 1993; Rubio and Figueras, 1998). 
On  the  one  hand,  doubts  and  criticisms  were  raised  in  relation  to  the  approved 
framework, in particular: (i) the possibility that there could be too tight a focus on the 
need for restrictive rules and too much incipience in the matter of coordinating fiscal 
policies; (ii)  the fact that such a choice seems to sanction the main objective of low 
inflation,  without  considering  an  alternative  that  could  balance  the  weight  of  the 
macroeconomic objectives in the context of the EMU; (iii) the fact that the choice made 
presupposed the existence of negative effects resulting from fiscal policy (cf., Solow, 
2004), seemingly ignoring the potentially positive effects of expansionist fiscal policies, 
in particular when coordinated. 
On the other hand, doubts and criticisms arose as to the way in which the need for 
fiscal discipline was conveyed and the way of supervising and acting on this matter, or 
rather, the established concrete fiscal rules. At this level, the aspects questioned included: 
(i)  the  reference  values  themselves,  taking  into  account  that  there  is  no  theoretical  
demonstration as to the superiority of a public deficit with a proportion of no greater than 
3% of the GDP; (ii) the fact that different initial situations and the different weight of 
each  economy  in  the  context  of  the  Union  were  not  considered;  (iii)  the  possible 
inadequacy  of  rules  in  case  of  economic  crisis  or  less  economic  growth;  (iv)  the 
insufficient attention paid to the criterion concerning the public debt ratio; (v) the method 
of calculating the public deficit relevant to the assessment of criterion fulfilment, not 
excluding  fundamentally  conjunctural  factors  and  public  investment  expenses  with   7 
reproductive  infrastructural  characteristics;  (vi)  the  credibility  of  the  sanctions 
themselves. 
Between 1996 and 2000, this type of criticisms diminished, in a context marked by 
the  optimism  related  to  the  creation  of  the  EMU  and  by  the  economic  upturn. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of this century, critical discussion came to the fore once 
again as a result of the economic difficulties felt by some of the major States and of the 
growing belief that the solution adopted in terms of fiscal discipline could, in fact, be 
hindering a more effective fight against the negative effects of the economic crisis, or 
even worsening the difficulties. 
In  this  period,  opinions  arose  in  favour  of  greater  flexibility  in  the  rules  and  a 
greater balance between nominal and real objectives, culminating in the classification of 
“stupid” being attributed to the SGP by the President of the European Commission at that 
time, Romano Prodi. 
The request for greater flexibility was based mainly on the idea that a restrictive 
fiscal policy in a context of crisis would be counter-productive: in this context, the simple 
work  of  the  automatic  stabilisers  probably  generates  higher  budget  deficit;  if  the 
government responds to this through budget cuts, it makes the economic crisis worse, and 
in doing so, it may aggravate budgetary problems even further. On the other hand, as the 
SGP  only  automatically  sanctioned  deficits  considered  excessive  in  situations  of  real 
GDP growth of no lesser than -0.75%/year, such an exception would be insufficient, 
seeing  as  there  was  no  consideration  of  situations  of  accumulated  production  loss 
resulting from periods of stagnation or low economic growth. In the third place, the time   8 
period for correcting situations of excessive deficit could be too short, highlighting the 
undesirable pro-cyclical tendency of the restrictive policies to be taken. 
The suspension of the SGP for two large European countries, France and Germany, 
which occurred in November 2003 (European Council, 2003), determined the demise of 
its  original  form  and  the  appearance  of  a  “new”  SGP  after  March  2005  (European 
Council, 2005). 
3. Properties of “ideal” fiscal rules 
An analysis of the need (or not) for changes to the original SGP and of the possible 
improvements  introduced  with  its  recent  reform  can  be  made  by  considering  the 
classification put forward by Kopits and Symansky (1998), concerning the definition of 
“ideal fiscal rules”. Reasonable consensus for this classification has been reached among 
authors with different positions regarding the kind of rules and their supporting indicators 
(cf., for example, Buti et al., 2003; and Creel, 2003). 
According to this classification, for a set of fiscal rules to be seen as “ideal”, they 
would have to be: 
(i) “clearly defined” in terms of the indicators to be used, the institutional cover and 
the specific escape clauses, in such a way as to avoid ambiguities and deficiencies in 
practical application; 
(ii)  “transparent”  in  terms  of  the  set  of  governmental  operations,  including 
accounting, forecasting and institutional arrangements, so as to obtain “popular support”; 
(iii) “simple”, so that they could be fully understood by the public;   9 
(iv) “enforceable” in the sense that there are legal or constitutional rules through 
which to enforce them, as well as credible sanctions for cases of non-compliance and the 
definition of the competent authority to apply them; 
(v) “flexible” in order to deal with exogenous shocks, i.e., situations beyond the 
authorities’ control; 
(vi) “adequate” in relation to the specific objectives; 
(vii) “consistent” with each other, as well as with other macroeconomic policies and 
other policy rules; 
(viii) “efficient”, so that they could be seen as catalysts of fiscal reform that would 
be, to a certain extent, necessary to ensure the sustainability of the budget position. 
These  eight  requisites  cover  a  mixture  of  economic  and  political  concepts.  In 
particular, the first four are of a more political nature, while the other four are more 
economic in nature. On the other hand, not only is it difficult for any set of fiscal rules to 
meet  the  eight  requirements,  but  some  trade-offs  are  inevitable  between  them:  at  the 
economic level, for example, between transparency and flexibility or between simplicity 
and possibility of application; at the political level, for instance, between transparency 
and simplicity. 
In any case, they are based on a set of target properties for defining fiscal rules and 
making them credible, and in each concrete case, a choice will have to be made according 
to preference for some of these requirements: “choosing among the alternative trade-offs 
remains a political choice” (Creel, 2003, p. 6).   10 
It must also be taken into account that this classification was put forward in order to 
assess the quality of fiscal rules within a national framework: as stated by Buti et al. 
(2003), the multinational nature of the rules in the European case affects their design and 
implementation.  On  the  one  hand,  there  are  questions  related  to  subsidiarity  and  to 
national sovereignty, implying that the rules must be as neutral as possible in view of the 
social preferences of each Member-State. On the other hand, the nature and relevance of 
the mentioned trade-offs may differ: for example, with the successive enlargements of the 
Union, the heterogeneity and dispersion of preferences have increased and it has become 
even more difficult to find optimal uniform fiscal rules. 
4. An evaluation of the original SGP 
Using the properties defined by Kopits and Symansky (1998), some authors assessed the 
performance of the SGP in a very positive way. Table 1 shows the assessment made by 
Buti el al. (2003), based upon which only slight changes to the SGP rules would be 
justified. These changes should reinforce its capacity for application and for incentive to 
fiscal  reforms,  the  fields  in  which  the  European  fiscal  rules  obtained  the  worst 
classification,  according  to  the  same  authors.  Also  according  to  them,  an  attempt  to 
change the rules radically would involve a severe political and economic problem.
1   11 
Table 1 – Comparison of the SGP rules with the properties of the “ideal rules” 
“Ideal” fiscal rules  Buti et al. (2003)  Creel (2003)  Our Analysis 
(1) “Clearly defined”  ++  +  ++ 
(2) Transparent  ++  +  + 
(3) Simple  +++  +++  +++ 
(4) Flexible  ++  +  + 
(5) Adequate for the final objective  ++  +  – 
(6) Enforceable  +  –  – 
(7) Consistent  ++  –  – 
(8) Efficient  +  –  – 
Key: +++ “very good”; ++ “good”; + “adequate”; – “weak” 
 
This optimistic view was not shared by various authors (e.g., Creel, 2003), nor is it 
shared by us, as shown in Table 1.  
In  the  first  place,  the  SGP  proved  incapable  of  being  “enforceable”  or  even  of 
promoting  some  change  in  the  behaviour  of  the  transgressors  by  raising  the  costs  of 
public debt subsequent to a loss of credibility. Particularly enlightening at this level are 
examples such as the suspension of the SGP, the fact that some countries successively 
transgressed the rules without being sanctioned or the null impact on long-term interest 
rates when Ecofin adopted an excessive deficit procedure for France in 2002/2003. 
Then,  the  capacity  to  encourage  countries  to  carry  out  structural  reforms  also 
proved to be very low, which did not allow counter-cyclical policies to be adopted at a   12 
time of recession or of weak economic growth, except at the expense of transgressing the 
rules.  
On the other hand, flexibility also proved to be only apparent. It is certain that 
although the mechanism incorporates exception clauses and it would be possible to let the 
automatic stabilisers act without going into transgression if Member-States began with an 
initial situation of balance. But the truth is that these clauses seem to be too severe and 
the starting point for some countries was already very close to the limit situation.  
Finally, adequacy itself to the final objective of fiscal discipline and consistency 
with other macroeconomic policies would fall short of what is desirable: (i) some of the 
countries  did  not  fulfil  their  stability  programmes;  (ii)  the  pact  did  not  encourage 
coordination, and did not even refer to it; (iii) the coherence between a counter-cyclical 
fiscal  policy  and  a  more  expansionist  monetary  policy  within  a  framework  of  low 
probability of inflationist consequences also does not seem to have been ensured. 
In this context, the removal of the weaker points would require a deeper reform of 
the  fiscal  rules.  In  fact,  the  discussion  in  most  recent  years  has  produced  various 
proposals  for  procedure  reform  and,  in  some  cases,  for  the  supporting  indicators 
themselves. Amongst them, it would be worth mentioning: 
(i)  Casella  (1999)  proposed  that  the  aggregate  budget  balance  of  the  eurozone 
should be taken into account, together with a market system of deficit assignment; in this 
way,  the  maximum  limit  established  for  the  proportion  of  public  deficit  to  the  GDP 
would be valid only for the eurozone as a whole, with each Member-State individually 
being able to exceed this limit, by exchanging (on the market) rights to create deficits; in   13 
these circumstances, a country that was hit by a negative shock could use the fiscal policy 
in a counter-cyclical way, buying rights from countries with a surplus; 
(ii) several authors, including Mills and Quinet (2001), Brunila (2002), von Hagen 
(2002), Fitoussi and Creel (2002) and Creel (2003), have proposed the introduction of a 
rule relating to the composition and quality of public expenditure or the change to the so-
called “golden rule” of public finance; the focus on the side of public expenditure, rather 
than the budget balance, would offer the advantage of greater possibility of control, since 
this  depends  less  on  the  economic  cycle  than  the  fiscal  revenue;  the  adoption  of  the 
“golden rule” would allow intertemporal dilution of the costs of public investment and 
could generate, according to Creel (2003), better results in the light of the criteria of the 
aforementioned ideal fiscal rules; 
(iii)  considering  that  the  objectives  conveyed  in  the  maximum  limit  of  3%  for 
public deficit to GDP and in the budget balance in the medium and long run would be 
arbitrary and inconsistent with an adequate budget position,
2 Buiter and Grafe (2004) 
proposed  a  change  in  assessing  structural  balance  and  introduced  the  idea  of  a 
“permanent  balance  rule”;  the  permanent  budget  balance  would  be  the  difference 
between  the  average  long-term  future  value  of  fiscal  revenue  (constant)  and  public 
expenditure;  the  adoption  of  this  indicator  would  enable  less  restriction  on  the 
performance of fiscal policy for countries with greater potential for economic growth and 
a higher rate of inflation; 
(iv) considering that budget sustainability depends essentially on the stock of public 
debt and not on the individual values of the public deficit, Pisani-Ferry (2004) suggested 
the introduction of a Debt Sustainability Pact; such a pact would oblige the presentation   14 
of  medium-term  programmes  that  would  reveal  the  medium-term  objectives  for  the 
proportion of public debt to GDP and would enable the States in which this indicator was 
less than 50% to be exempt from the procedures of excessive deficit and the associated 
sanctions; fiscal discipline would be oriented according to a longer time perspective and 
based on the long-term sustainability of the budget situation; 
(v) considering that the numerical rules in force did not attack at source the problem 
of possible fiscal indiscipline and that the SGP would need a more credible application, 
less  dependent  on  the  decisions  of  the  parties  at  which  it  is  aimed,  several  authors, 
including  Wren-Lewis  (2003),  von  Hagen  (2002)  and  Wyplosz  (2005),  suggested 
reinforcing financial market discipline and adopting procedural and institutional reforms; 
in this area, it is particularly worth to mention the suggestions put forward by Wyplosz 
(2005) to create independent “National Committees for Fiscal Policy”, responsible for 
ensuring supervision of fiscal discipline and debt sustainability. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that each of these proposals would also present 
some difficulties in terms of concrete definition or implementation. A good description of 
them can be found in Buti et al. (2003, 2005). 
5. The “new” SGP: evaluating changes 
As mentioned above, the inversion of the economic situation at the beginning of the 21st 
century and the worsening of real problems, associated with the loss of competitiveness 
and  employment,  prompted  renewed  debate  and  criticism,  both  in  the  academic  and 
political field.    15 
This discussion culminated in the SGP reform, with the aim of greater flexibility of 
application, without affecting the maintenance of fiscal discipline. In the context of this 
reform, the following was established: 
(i) the period for implementing and making effective the measures for correcting 
excessive deficits was extended, possibly up to 4 (or even more) years, instead of 1 and 2 
years as it was before; 
(ii) the relevance of the structural correction in periods of effective product growth 
above its potential level, taking as a reference the decrease in structural deficit by  around 
0.5%/year,  enabling  more  margin  for  manoeuvre  in  periods  in  which  economic 
difficulties arise; 
(iii) the attribution of greater relevance to the criterion relating to the proportion of 
public  debt  to  GDP  (practically  ignored  until  now),  as  a  means  of  assessing  the 
sustainability of the budget position in the medium and long run; 
(iv) the extension of circumstances that determine the non-automatic application of 
sanctions,  now  allowing  this  possibility  for  situations  of  real  growth  of  the  negative 
product  (instead  of  -2%)  and  including  situations  of  accumulated  production  losses 
during an extended period of considerably weak growth in relation to potential growth; 
(v) the possibility of including different “pertinent” factors when taking decisions 
on the situation (or not) of excessive public deficit, enabling the consideration of various 
forms of public expenditure as justifying factors for a public deficit ratio superior to the 
maximum  limit  (namely  expenses  in  areas  such  of  defence,  social  security  reform, 
policies  supporting  innovation,  research  and  development,  European  reunification  – 
particularly in the case of Germany –, etc.).   16 
It is now important to assess the terms of this “reform” in the light of the theory 
and,  in  particular,  of  the  properties  of  the  “ideal”  fiscal  rules,  in  order  to  conclude 
whether (or not) the SGP has become “more flexible and less ‘stupid’”.  
As can be easily identified, some of the criticisms and reform proposals may have 
been taken into account at the time of the “review”, in particular in terms of the need for 
greater flexibility of the rules. In fact, both the extension of the period for correcting 
excessive  deficits  and  the  extension  of  the  escape  clauses,  or  even  the  possibility  of 
considering different attenuating factors or a situation of apparent excessive deficit, seem 
to provide the States with a wider margin for manoeuvre in the event of a situation of 
exogenous shock, due to changes in circumstances that are beyond governmental control. 
In this area, the assessment of the “new” SGP, according to our interpretation of the 
criteria defined by Kopits and Symansky (1998), is more favourable in what relates to 
flexibility,  going  from  a  classification  of  “adequate”  to  “very  good”  (Table  2).  The 
analysis  made  by  Buti  et  al.  (2005)  points  in  the  same  direction,  though  within  a 
somewhat different framework to the original analysis. 
In our opinion, it seems equally possible to give this “new” SGP a more favourable 
rating in two other areas, albeit with some reservations. In the first place, in terms of the 
criterion of “adequacy” relative to the fundamental objective, in which the qualitative 
classification would go from “weak” to “adequate”: if the renewed attention to fulfilment 
of the criterion relative to public debt is credible, some behaviour of creative accounting 
and of putting some expenses off-budget could be discouraged, as well as possibly raising 
the long-term sustainability of the budgetary positions. In any case, the doubts as to the 
credibility of this change, taking into account its track-record and the reduction in the   17 
degree of “enforcement”, due to the inclusion of several attenuating factors, could make 
the classification maintain its former negative value. 
 
Table 2 – Comparison of the original SGP with the “new” SGP (2005) – our view 
“Ideal” fiscal rules  SGP (1997)  SGP (2005) 
(1) “Clearly defined”  ++  + 
(2) Transparent  +  – 
(3) Simple  +++  +++ 
(4) Flexible  +  +++ 
(5) Adequate for the final objective  –  +/– (?) 
(6) Enforceable  –  – 
(7) Consistent  –  – 
(8) Efficient  –  + (?) 
Key: +++ “very good”; ++ “good”; + “adequate”; – “weak” 
 
Secondly, in terms of the criterion of “efficiency”: in this case, the reference to the 
importance of structural balance and the need for structural corrections in periods of 
effective economic growth above the potential level could lead governments to redouble 
their attention to the necessary taxation and public spending reforms, which would 
change the classification in this area from “weak” to “adequate” (or even “good”). In any 
case, the fact that the “new” rules could lead to too much flexibility might result in no 
alteration to the rating in this area.   18 
The most negative element of the recent SGP reform seems to be the excessive and 
particularly  subjective  number  of  attenuating  situations  for  non-compliance  of  the 
maximum ratio of 3% between the public deficit and GDP. If some of these attenuating 
circumstances  seem  clearly  pertinent,  namely  with  regard  to  some  public  investment 
expenses or in relation to the clearance for certain kinds of structural reforms at the level 
of social security, the inclusion of others, apparently at the choice of each State in the 
eurozone, seems once again to raise the problems of creativity  at the level of public 
accounting, as well as difficulties in the practical application of fiscal discipline rules.  
The apparently exaggerated set of “escape valves” could thus make the new version 
of the SGP even less “enforceable” than the former, which would naturally harm the 
rating  in  almost  all  the  properties  of  the  “ideal  rules”,  in  particular  in  terms  of  the 
“applicability” (where the negative classification is maintained, with the possibility of 
becoming even more negative), of the “adequate definition” and of the “transparency” as 
well as, under certain circumstances and such as indicated above, of the “efficiency” and 
of the “adequacy” to the final objective. 
It is worth noting that somewhat identical concerns are raised by Buti et al. (2005), 
leading to a significant convergence between our appraisal and the assessment developed 
by these authors, which was not the case for the original SGP. At the same time, authors 
clearly  critical  of  the  original  SGP  also  express  concerns  about  the  potential  for 
opportunistic use of the exceptions and the fact that the true roots of the problem are not 
attacked (e.g., Buiter, 2005; Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry, 2005). 
Finally, there does not seem to be a reason for changing the classification given to 
the remaining two areas: of “simplicity” (“very good”), since the supporting indicators   19 
are the same and are perfectly understandable to the general public; and of “consistency” 
(“weak”),  since  there  continues  to  be  no  obligatory  and  sanctioned  reference  to  the 
coordination of national fiscal policies. Consequently, there seems to be no reason for 
more effective coherence between the various national fiscal policies and between these 
and the common monetary policy. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In  this  paper  we  assess  the  rules  of  the  “new”  SGP,  bearing  in  mind  the  properties 
established by Kopits and Symansky (1998) and the framework of the discussion of the 
last two decades on the method of implementing fiscal discipline in the eurozone. 
Our analysis clearly indicates that the changes that occurred in March 2005 have 
made the Pact “more flexible and less ‘stupid’”, enabling more time for adjustment in the 
face  of  difficult  budget  situations  and,  at  least  theoretically,  encouraging  structural 
reforms and the good use of favourable economic situations in order to reorganise public 
accounts. Equally, by rising the number of circumstances in which sanctions do not occur 
automatically, including situations of stagnation or weak economic growth or favouring 
incentives to R&D activities,
3 the Pact has become a better “friend” of Growth, without 
harming Stability. 
The main criticism now seems to centre round “enforcement”, since the fact that 
there is a vast set of factors that allow the non-classification of a deficit as excessive 
would  seemingly  lead  to  situations  of  less  compliance  and  even  to  the  repetition  of 
creative and lax behaviour in some countries, just as in the past.   20 
In  this  context,  certain  suggestions  could  be  put  forward  so  as  to  enable  some 
improvement in the conditions of SGP application: (i) the consideration of a relatively 
exhaustive list of expenses that could be considered “excludable” from the calculation of 
the  relevant  public  deficit;  (ii)  reinforced  vigilance  in  the  efforts  to  improve  public 
accounts in periods of economic expansion as a means of enabling a wider margin for 
manoeuvre  for  fiscal  policy  in  periods  of  recession;  (iii) the  introduction  of  concrete 
greater attention to sustainability of the public debt, following one of the vectors of the 
reform and enabling it to move in the direction proposed by, among others, Pisani-Ferry 
(2004); (iv) particular attention to the reforms in the scope of Social Security, which 
emerges  as  one  of  the  fundamental  areas  for  sustainability  of  public  accounts  in  the 
medium  run,  in  view  of  the  problems  arising  from  an  unfavourable  demographic 
evolution. 
These  suggestions  would  certainly  improve  the  classification  given  to  the  fiscal 
discipline rules of the SGP. However, they would not end up the discussion on the ideal 
framework fiscal discipline within the euro area. One of the most important issues that 
still are open is the question of how to provide an adequate policy mix in the context of 
the EMU, as the mere adoption of fiscal rules, even if well classified in terms of the 
former properties, will hardly do it. 
Admitting  that  a  situation  of  great  (political)  difficulty  will  be  maintained  in 
promoting fiscal “centralisation”, the solution could involve a significant degree of fiscal 
policy coordination. In accordance with the relevant literature, this solution would tend to 
produce welfare gains when compared with non-cooperative solutions,
4 although it would 
also continue to show some difficulties.
5   21 
It is worth noting that at the level of economic literature itself, the analyses on the 
coordination of monetary policies continue to predominate, with a much lower number of 
studies aimed at coordinating fiscal policies (and these with monetary policies), even 
though the European case has encouraged development in this area.
6 In this context, this 
area appears to be potentially fertile ground in terms of future research.  
Finally,  it  should  be  said  that,  despite  the  greater  flexibility  resulting  from  the 
change  in  some  rules,  it  is  not  clear  that  an  environment  suitable  for  combating  the 
negative effects resulting from specific or asymmetric shocks has been created. Within 
this framework, the creation of a limited mechanism of absorption of this type of shock 
could enable a more satisfactory solution, possibly without requiring a very significant 
budgetary increase. 
Such a solution would result in an attempt to promote some form of “insurance”, 
typical  of  federations  with  single  currency  and  advised,  for  instance,  by  the  relevant 
literature in the context of the optimal currency areas. At this level, and for the European 
case, some proposals have been already made, namely following the pioneering works of 
Italianer  and  Vanheukelen  (1992)  and  Italianer  and  Pisani-Ferry  (1994),  constituting 




1 “The obvious risk is that of ending up in a vacuum in which the old rules are called into question while 
the agreement on a new set of rules fails to materialise. Venturing the EMU without fiscal rules would be a 
leap in the dark. At the same time, given the current level of political integration, the conditions for a 
federal system of public finances do not seem to exist.” (Buti et al., 2003, p. 28). 
2 Similar, in fact, to the criticisms of the Maastricht rules that Buiter et al. (2003) had already formulated in 
1993.   22 
 
3 Note, for instance, that recently, Afonso and Alves (2006) suggested that temporarily excessive deficits 
should be allowed for the small and less developed countries within the euro area, in order to let the 
government subsidize R&D activities and, thus, reduce the level of development gap. 
4 There is a great deal of literature on this subject, starting with the seminal works of Niehans (1968), 
Cooper (1968) and Hamada (1976). 
5 Among others, see the arguments developed by Frankel and Rockett (1988), Miller and Salmon (1985), 
Maillet (1992) and Tabellini (1990). 
6 Taking the case of the European Union as a base, it is worth consulting Beetsma and Bovenberg (2001), 
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￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ - ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿" ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ - ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿   + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿￿  ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  4 ￿
1 ￿ * ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  9 ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ "# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ "% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  & ￿
6 ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ; ￿ +￿ # ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿) ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  0 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿
) ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿￿
> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % - ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ * ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ?￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿
5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿    ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 8 9 : ; $< = = ; > ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿
# ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿4 9 ￿
# ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ! ￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ’ * ￿ +￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ += ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿4 ! ￿
# * ￿ 3 , ￿ ￿ ￿ A - ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ * $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
: ￿ ￿ ￿ += ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿￿￿￿￿4 & ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ += ￿ ￿ ￿
￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿4 ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "% ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿4 ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ += ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿4 0 ￿
6 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ += ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿
￿ ￿ * C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ’ * ￿ +￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B ￿ * ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ’ * ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ - ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B ￿ * ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿4   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ "# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ "% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
B ￿ * ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 4 ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B ￿ * ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 9 ￿
￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ 0   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
# ￿ 3 * ￿ += ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ - ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5￿ / ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ * ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿￿- ￿# - ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿C ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ * ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 & ￿
# ￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ "# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿D￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 0 ￿
) ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ - ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ 5 ￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿- ￿) - ￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ - ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿9   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ? ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿
￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ - ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
@ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ E ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿F ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ / ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿
6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ G ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) - ￿ . ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
I ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    & ￿
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